Remove duplicate story 34 security file (renumbered to 35)

The security/sandboxing story was renumbered from 34 to 35 but the
old 34_agent_security_and_sandboxing.md was never deleted. Story 34
is now Per-Project Agent Configuration and Role Definitions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.story_kit/stories/upcoming/34_agent_security_and_sandboxing.md

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Story 34: Agent Security and Sandboxing
-
-## User Story
-**As a** supervisor orchestrating multiple autonomous agents,
-**I want to** constrain what each agent can access and do,
-**So that** agents can't escape their worktree, damage shared state, or perform unintended actions.
-
-## Acceptance Criteria
-- [ ] Agent creation accepts an `allowed_tools` list to restrict Claude Code tool access per agent.
-- [ ] Agent creation accepts a `disallowed_tools` list as an alternative to allowlisting.
-- [ ] Agents without Bash access can still perform useful coding work (Read, Edit, Write, Glob, Grep).
-- [ ] Investigate replacing direct Bash/shell access with Rust-implemented tool proxies that enforce boundaries:
-  - Scoped `exec_shell` that only runs allowlisted commands (e.g., `cargo test`, `npm test`) within the agent's worktree.
-  - Scoped `read_file` / `write_file` that reject paths outside the agent's worktree root.
-  - Scoped `git` operations that only work within the agent's worktree.
-- [ ] Evaluate `--max-turns` and `--max-budget-usd` as safety limits for runaway agents.
-- [ ] Document the trust model: what the supervisor controls vs what agents can do autonomously.
-
-## Questions to Explore
-- Can we use MCP (Model Context Protocol) to expose our Rust-implemented tools to Claude Code, replacing its built-in Bash/filesystem tools with scoped versions?
-- What's the right granularity for shell allowlists — command-level (`cargo test`) or pattern-level (`cargo *`)?
-- Should agents have read access outside their worktree (e.g., to reference shared specs) but write access only within it?
-- Is OS-level sandboxing (Docker, macOS sandbox profiles) worth the complexity for a personal tool?
-
-## Out of Scope
-- Multi-user authentication or authorization (single-user personal tool).
-- Network-level isolation between agents.
-- Encrypting agent communication channels (all local).